

THE  
COMPARISON:

OR,

*Accounts on Both Sides*

FAIRLY STATED;

IN A

*View of the Management*

OF THE

WAR in SPAIN,

Under the respective Commands

OF THE

{ PETERBOROUGH

Earls of

AND

{ Gallway.

Occasion'd by some late Enquiries in the  
HOUSE of PEERS.

With their LORDSHIPS Proceedings thereupon.

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
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## T H E Comparison, &c.

**T**HE Debates of the House of Lords upon the Affairs of *Spain*, occasion'd by a want of Conduct in those parts that seems almost irretrievable, having given Being to various Opinions and Conjectures, and to several Pamphlets on that Head; amongst which, one entituled, *An Account of the Earl of Gallway's Conduct in Spain and Portugal*, seem'd to call in question their Lordships Decision: It may not be improper to undeceive such people as run away with false Appearances for Matter of Fact, by setting things in a true Light, and presenting them to the View of the Publick with a Freedom that is altogether impartial and disinterested.

In order to this, the fairest Method I can think of, is to leave the Detail of the *Accounts* on both sides to the Judgment of the Reader; and since I confine myself to the Transactions in *Spain* during the several Commands of the Earls of *Peterborough* and *Gallway*, (there being no room for a Dispute concerning the Behaviour of their Successor, General *Stanhope*) I shall proceed by way of *Comparison*; that is, by laying down the Particulars of each of their Actions, that he may make an Estimate from thence, which has been most deserving of the *Thanks of Parliament*, the Noble Person that has been honour'd *with* them, or He that in all probability will go *without* them.

To begin with the Earl of *Peterborough*, his Lordship having been constituted and appointed Captain-General of Her Majesty's Forces, and Admiral and Commander in Chief of the Fleet bound for the *Mediterranean*, sail'd on Board the *Ranelagh*, with King *Charles III.* on the 28th of *July*, 1705. from *Lisbon*, and appear'd off *Barcelona* *August* the 16th following; when, at a Council of War call'd in the Presence of his Catholick Majesty, it having been offer'd to the Consideration of the General Officers, Whether the Siege of *Barcelona* ought to be undertaken? they came to this unanimous Resolution, That the said Siege could not be undertaken with any probability of Success. However, at another Council of War, held *August* the 26th, seeing his Lordship, their Chief Commander, had declar'd in favour of the aforesaid Siege, it was agreed to form it; tho' soon after, on the 28th of the same Month, to sail with all the Troops to *Savoy*; which, indeed, was the first Design of his Lordship's Expedition. But the King of *Spain* taking a Resolution to stay by his faithful Subjects of *Catalonia*, his Lordship saw himself reduc'd to a necessity of either going home *re infecta*, or taking this Attempt upon himself: Wherefore, not caring for being a General without doing something, he chose rather to trust to the Good-nature of his Country, which he hop'd would pardon his succeeding in so considerable an Action, tho' not strictly undertaken by a formal Order. My Lord, therefore, now made use only of his own Thoughts, and by an uncommon Artifice made the never-to-be-forgotten Attack upon *Fort-Montjuic*; which has been ungenerously attributed to the Prince of *Hesse*, who was only a Voluntier in the Action, and never so much as appriz'd of its being to be made till the Execution; and which, by its Surrender, occasion'd that of the Town, which was garison'd by as many Troops as the Army was compos'd of that laid Siege to it.

The Reduction of this important Place was follow'd by those of *Gironne*, *Lerida*, *Tortosa*, *Terragona*, &c.  
and



and by the Expulsion of the whole *French* Army (that  
 fate down before *Barcelona* in order to retake it, to the  
 number of 24000 Men, commanded by King *Philip* in  
 Person, and the Marechal de *Thesse*) out of *Spain* into  
 the Province of *Roussillon*, by the means of his Lordship,  
 who so distress'd them in their Camp by a flying Army,  
 not more than 2500 strong, which he brought with him  
 from *Valencia*, that they were forc'd to abandon it and  
 their Artillery, with all their Baggage; and had never  
 set footing in *Spain* again, had his Lordship's Advice  
 for the King's immediate March to *Madrid* taken place  
 with that Court. For he plainly foresaw what Designs  
 the Common Enemy had to put in execution for the Re-  
 covery of *Spain*, and therefore made all the pressing In-  
 stances imaginable to his Majesty to hasten his depar-  
 ture, because it was beyond contradiction that the  
 King's Presence in his Capital in that juncture would  
 have made all the Chief Places in his Dominions de-  
 clare for him; and an ordinary Force upon the Fron-  
 tiers of *Navarre* would have secur'd the Passage there  
 against any second Entrance of the *French* into *Spain*.  
 These Motives and Arguments urg'd by my Lord *Peter-*  
*borough*, had their proper Weight with the Court and  
 the Army; and accordingly it was twice unanimously  
 resolv'd in a General Council of War, by all the Mini-  
 sters and Officers, that the King should with all dili-  
 gence march towards *Valencia*, and that his Lordship  
 with 6000 Men should go before, and prepare every  
 thing to carry on his Majesty to *Madrid*.

Yet were these Resolutions so far from being put in  
 practice, that, tho' his Lordship had brought the whole  
 Kingdom of *Valencia* before this under his Majesty's  
 Obedience, they were wholly neglected; though the  
 Day was settl'd for the King's Departure from *Barce-*  
*lona*; nay, what is more, the very Rout of his Journey  
 adjust'd, and his Lordship having sent all the Cavalry  
 before, went on Board the Fleet with the Foot, who  
 were in no condition to march for want of Baggage-  
 B 2 Necessaries,

Necessaries, and landed at *Valencia* in few days after. His Lordship thought he could make no better use of his short stay here, than to recruit his shatter'd Cavalry; which he not only did, but mounted a new Regiment of Dragoons, draughted out of the Companies of Foot; there being always in this Country, and especially in his Circumstances, which requir'd Dispatch, a necessity for a good Body of Horse: In which single Regiment his Lordship sav'd the Queen (which may seem a Paradox to some) 20000 Pounds; the Horses, one with another, costing not above Ten Pounds apiece, which, if they had been transported from *England* or *Ireland*, would have stood Her Majesty at least in Sixty Pounds, as those were actually found to do, which first went upon the Descent into *Catalonia*; And this Regiment, to shew his Lordship's earnest desire to march into *Castile*, had its Rout given it the very same day it was mounted.

To facilitate this Entrance into *Castile*, his Lordship immediately sent Lieutenant-General *Wyndham* with a Body of 1500 Horse to besiege *Requena*; a strong and troublesom Garison, and indeed the only one in the Road to *Madrid*, and the first Frontier-Town of the Enemy. The Enterprize succeeded to his wishes, and the Way lay open for his Majesty's March; for his Lordship prov'd to the King, by the constant passing of Deserters as well as Expresses, that there was nothing now to hinder his Majesty from reaching *Madrid* with a small Party of Horse only; and he thought a King need'd not much persuasion to take Possession of a Crown, when 'twould be rather a Journey of Pleasure than a March, and this to be easily perform'd in a Fortnights time.

Yet, notwithstanding all these Preparations for carrying on the King and his Troops, and tho' by frequent Messengers and Letters he had urg'd the Necessity of the King's immediate departure from *Barcelona*, his Majesty did not think fit to set out from that place till  
near

near a Month after the time agreed on. 'Twas yet a greater Surprize to his Lordship, that the King, upon his Arrival at *Terragona*, had quite alter'd the Scheme of his March, and taken a Resolution of going round by *Saragossa*; whereupon he remonstrated to his Majesty, with all the earnestness imaginable, the Danger of the least Delay in such a critical Conjunction. But neither the Hazards nor Inconveniencies of so dangerous a March, wherein his Majesty might run the risque of being intercepted by the Enemy, nor the more than ordinary Zeal his Lordship shew'd in persuading the King from it, by dispatching Letters after Letters, a Deputation from the *Valencian* Nobility, and the Opinions of several Councils of War for that purpose, were of any force or weight. Some particular persons about the King had more Authority with him, and he persisted in his Measures; always giving it as a Reason of his going by *Saragossa*, that the Generals of the *Portuguese* would move that way, and had promis'd to secure his March to their Camp. Wherefore his Lordship still flatter'd himself with Hopes, since he perceiv'd there was a Correspondence between his Majesty and the *Portuguese* Army, who were now (as he was told) Masters of *Madrid*, those who had the Command there would make all the Advantages of so happy a Conjunction, and not only secure that Capital till they had safely conducted the King thither, but take care to seize and fortifie the Passes in *Navarre*, the only and obvious Expedient left, since the King was resolv'd on these new Methods, to keep him in the quiet Possession of his Kingdom.

What Motives his Majesty had for this extraordinary change of his Sentiments, is best known to his Majesty; that they could not arise from any want of Respect or Obedience in his Lordship is very manifest, since, tho' some of his Ill-wishers attribute the cause of this Journey through *Arragon* to his Lordship's peremptory denying the King Money for his necessary Charges, tho' he



he had receiv'd 103000 l. at that time remitted from *England* for his Majesty's Service; his Lordship was so far from refusing the King upon this Account any Money which he had in his power to give him, that his Lordship not having receiv'd any part of the pretended 103000 l. was forc'd to order for that purpose 40000 l. appropriated to other Uses. And 'tis well known to all those that are well acquainted with what pass'd in *Spain*, that his Lordship, to clear himself from these Calumnies, brought Mr. *Mead*, the Queens Paymaster, before the King and Mr. *Stanhope*, who, in regard to these points, gave this Account to the King, *That all his Troops had been paid ten days advance, for which he produc'd their Receipts; that no part of the 103000 l. was come to his hands; but that however 40000 l. had been advanc'd for his Majesty's Service, at the earnest solicitations of the Earl of Peterborough, which was design'd and appointed for other Services.*

Nay, when, upon his arrival at *Saragossa*, his Majesty was in want of a Supply, and wrote to my Lord of *Peterborough* for it, his Lordship immediately sent all the Money he had of his own, and what he could get upon Credit, and had his Majesty's Thanks return'd for it in a very obliging Letter: So far was he from refusing the King Money towards supporting the March that was at first design'd, and so much wish'd-for by his Lordship, that he took care his Majesty should not want it, even in a Journey which his Lordship could by no means approve of.

What remain'd for his Lordship to do, now there were no hopes of the King's coming through *Valencia*, which he was oblig'd to wait for, by the Fundamental Council of War at *Barcelona*, was to order all the Forces to advance into *Castile*, except about 1000 Men, which were left for the necessary Security of the Kingdom of *Valencia*: And in this he was forc'd to have the Opinion of a Council of War, of both *Spaniards* and *English*, to release him from the Obligation he lay under of staying for the



the King; his Lordship having been always so cautious as to act by a Council of War, ever since that Action of taking *Barcelona* without one.

Thus though His Majesty did not think fit at that time to be conducted to his Capital by the E. of *Peterborough* (the King having sent him word just before the abovemention'd March, that the *Portuguese* Army would be sufficient to protect him from any attempts the Enemy could make against him,) the Earl thought it his Duty to be near at hand to Succour him upon any emergency, and therefore made it his Choice rather to neglect sending the Forces under his Command to the Relief of the Duke of *Savoy* pursuant to His Majesty's Orders, than preventing the return of the *French* into *Spain*, and securing the Country round *Madrid*: wherefore he desir'd to be excus'd from complying with his Majesty's directions, and continu'd on his March thro' *Castile*. So far was his Lordship from shewing any unwillingness to carry his Troops thither, or refusing to advance when he had Orders for it; that when he did March 'twas contrary to the King's desires, who urg'd him immediately to pursue the Orders he had receiv'd from the Queen, and Embarque the Succours for *Italy*.

And indeed his Majesty was quickly convinc'd that his Lordship had judg'd right; for instead of being able to go on triumphantly from *Saragosa* to *Madrid*, his Majesty saw a necessity of writing pressingly to that Lord, to come up to him with all the dispatch imaginable, to secure his March to the Army at *Guadalaxara*. This his Lordship instantly comply'd with, by joining his Majesty near *Prastana*, and had at last the Honour of conducting him to the Confederate Forces; and this within a Fortnight after he had receiv'd the Advices mention'd above, that his Majesty had no further occasion for the Presence of Him or his Troops.

So that his Lordship, contrary to the Intentions of the Earl of *Galloway* and those who commanded the *Portuguese* Army, came up with them to be an Eyewitness

witness of their Retreat from the Capital, which he persuaded them (to no purpose) to repossess themselves of, now they had the King among them, and, in despite of their keeping no manner of Correspondence with him by Letter or otherwise, as appears by the Testimonies of several Couriers that went to the *Portuguese* Army through *Valencia* to his Majesty, came to assist them with his Forces and Advice.

Here his Lordship expected to have met a flourishing Army ready to carry the King in thro' to *Madrid*; not questioning but in those Forty Days, wherein he not only made Preparations to march into *Castile*, but took *Cartagena*, *Cuenca*, *Alicant*, and *Requena*, (Places of great Strength and Consequence) that the *Portuguese* General had with the like Caution and Activity secur'd the Country round *Madrid*; his Lordship being confident with good reason, that such Opportunities as those in his Hands would have enabled him to drive the Duke of *Berwick* beyond the *Ebro*: or at least not to have been so destitute of Information, as to have suffer'd an Army of 20000 Men to come within two Hours March of him, without the least Intelligence of their approach; or to have given them the opportunity of retaking *Madrid* without a Blow.

Yet this was the state in which Affairs were at his Lordship's arrival in the *Portuguese* Camp; and he found the Confederates, not only not prepar'd (as he had hop'd) for a Glorious Entrance into *Madrid*, but retreating before the Enemy, and every Body did that Justice to the Lord *Tyravly*, as to own, 'twas in a great measure owing to his Conduct, that upon such a Surprise they were capable of making any Retreat.

To recover the Disgrace of this almost fatal Miscarriage, the general Opinion inclin'd to Fighting; but the Earl of *Peterborough* knowing too well the irretrievable Consequences of a lost Battle, oppos'd this Motion, our Circumstances at that time being the most improper for such Expedients, that would hazard the entire Loss of  
what

what they were possess'd of in *Spain*: Yet at the same time his Lordship made an Offer to attempt, with 5000 Men, the Recovery of *Madrid*; and the Methods he design'd to take were allow'd so likely to succeed, that they were approv'd of more than once by the King and all the Generals. But at this time Consultations were tedious, and Executions slow; so that after two or three days Debate, the Design was laid aside meerly for want of Bread, there being as little Preparation there, as there had been for pursuing the Duke of *Berwick*.

Wherefore, since the Camp at *Guadalaxara* was no place for a Man of Enterprizing Genius to abide in, and the Resolutions of the other Generals were so fluctuating and uncertain as not to be any ways depended upon, his Lordship, after a few days continuance there, resolv'd to put in execution the Queens Orders that commanded him to *Italy*; which being shewn to the King and all the Generals at a Council of War, had their Approbation in writing according to form. To which Powers that authoriz'd him to leave *Spain*, his Lordship had very strong and prevailing Reasons to be added from the Posture of Affairs there. For the Condition of the Army was extremely miserable for want of Money, and the Prospect still worse, unless effectual Means were used for a speedy Supply. In this Necessity, the Ministers and Generals very pressingly recommended that Affair to his Lordship; the Marquis *das Minas* and the *Portuguese* Ambassador gave him Bills to transact for them at *Genoa*; and the King, to shew both his want of Money, and the great Confidence he had in his Lordship's Fidelity, gave him full Powers, sign'd and seal'd by his Royal Hand, to mortgage any part of his Dominions, rather than he should fail in his Negotiations. Which is a sufficient Confutation to all groundless Reports, such as his leaving the Army under Discontent, on account of his not having the sole Command of it, and making it a Voyage of Pleasure rather than of Business, or by any Orders.

What still confirm'd his Lordship in this Resolution of going to *Italy*, was, that he found at that juncture no occasion for his Presence in *Spain*: For the Campaign to all appearance was then at an end, and the Generals seem'd to propose nothing else than going into Winter-Quarters, and maintaining themselves there till the Season would give them leave to take the Field; and that this was the Design when his Lordship left them, will appear by the loud Remonstrances of all the *Spaniards* against the Retreat into *Valencia*, and how much possess'd the King and all his Officers were with this Opinion of keeping their Ground in *Castile*, the Count *Noyailles*, Velt-Mareschal of the Emperour, and General of the King of *Spain*, has in the fullest and most sensible manner explain'd in a Letter to the Earl of *Peterborough* while they were retreating; which, amongst other material Points, has these Passages: *With all the Spaniards of my Opinion, I could not procure our March from Chincon, or retard the Passage over the Tagus, in a Season so little advanc'd, and so proper for Action. We were flatter'd that Winter-Quarters should be establish'd in Castile, between the Xucar and Gabriel, where we are now encamp'd; but it is plainly seen that we shall march into the Kingdom of Valencia, so contrary to the King's Desires, &c.*

His Lordship, thro' the means of a deep penetration into Affairs, as it were foreseeing what would happen to the Army in *Castile*, was for providing against the Consequences of it before he left *Valencia* for *Italy*, and took care before his embarquing to fortifie and secure the Country and Coast against the Insults of the Bishop of *Murcia*; and therefore, tho' press'd by the King and the Lord *Galloway* to send up the Forces there into *Castile*, his Lordship had the unanimous Opinion, not only of all the Gentlemen of the Country, but of a Council of War held *Sept. 6. 1706.* at the General's Quarters in *Alicant*, That, considering the ill Circumstances of our Affairs in those Inland Parts, and the necessity of keep-

ing



ing a sure footing towards the Sea, it was of the highest Consequence, that the little number we had then in *Alicant* should continue there, the whole being not more than 900 Men, as well for securing the Kingdom of *Valencia*, as preserving the Communication with *Castile*, which, if cut off to the Sea, might expose the King's Person and the Army to the utmost Hazard. And had not this prudent foresight of his Lordship, back'd by the Consent of the Commanding Officers in *Valencia*, kept open this Communication between the Sea and the Castle, whither could they themselves that desir'd these Forces have made their Retreat? or where could their Army have subsisted till the Battle?

'Twas for the same Reasons that his Lordship resolv'd not to carry any of those Troops with him to *Italy*, and that he design'd upon any emergent Occasion from that Quarter to have drawn Supplies out of the Garisons of *Catalonia*: But having been some days at Sea, he had the good Fortune to hear of the decisive Battle of *Turin*, which had put it in the Duke of *Savoy's* Power to be much superiour to the Enemy in the Forces he already had, and to stand in need of no Auxiliaries from a Kingdom that could so very ill spare them.

How serviceable this Voyage to *Genoa*, and how all the Views of it were answer'd, cannot be more evidently manifested than they were by the Universal Applause of the *Spanish* Nation, and the Esteem and Respect paid by all the Princes abroad; and in particular, how sensible his *Catholick* Majesty was of the Advantages gain'd by it, appears fully by an Instrument under his own Hand, lately produc'd before the House of Lords, which makes mention of that very Expedition put in execution with his Approbation, and the Opinion of all the Ministers and Generals; and of his Lordship's obtaining in that Voyage most known Advantages to his Majesty's Service; and particularly commends that Vigour which is always found to distinguish his Actions, and which re-

*commends those Measures which his Zeal and Ability hath adjust'd with the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene, to whom he would notifie upon the first Occasion his entire Satisfaction in all he had transacted, &c.*

This Royal Testimony not only shews his Majesty's entire Approbation of this Voyage, but is a sufficient Reply to those malicious Insinuations that have been made of the King's Displeasure to the Earl. In his absence, indeed, false Suggestions, and the Contrivances and Cabals of others, have too often prevail'd : and during the Correspondence of the *Portugal* Army, not only unfortunate Methods took place, but, as his Lordship found at his return from *Italy*, the King had been by some Artifices wrought upon to signify to the Court of *England* some kind of Dissatisfaction with his Conduct.

Others likewise charge this Noble Peer with giving too large *Premio's* for the Money that was advanc'd for his Majesty's Use, and taking it at an extravagant Interest of 20 *per Cent.* for procuring the Money at *Genoa*, (which would have amounted to 20000*l.*) whereas not above 1000 was allow'd by his Lordship above the current Exchange; and such a Sum obtain'd in such difficult Circumstances, as 100000*l.* in so little time, and at so little loss, is as Extraordinary as any of those many Services he did in the *Spanish* War.

'Tis pity his Enemies did not say he over-rated his Baggage that was suffer'd to be taken after he had taken leave of the Army at *Guadalaxara*, that was offer'd to be made good to him at the rate of 10000 Pistoles, which it was actually worth, and which he generously refus'd; rather making it his choice to have the Army supply'd with two Months Provision of Corn, tho' it was under another General's Command, than have any Misfortune happen to the Confederate Arms, through his having the least Regard to his own Interest. An Action as unpresidented, and for some time as indifferently spoke of, as his taking *Barcelona* with as few Troops as the Garison of the Town, and relieving it after,

ter, when the Troops within and without were but a Handful of Men in respect to the Numbers of the Besiegers.

To come to a Period : His Lordship after his return from *Spain* acted in no Publick Post ; yet upon all Occasions shew'd the same Concern and Zeal for the Publick Good, and the Prosperity of her Majesty's Arms. And tho' he was dismiss'd from the Command of the Army, yet he did not think himself exempt from using his utmost Endeavours to promote the Interest of the Common Cause: Wherefore, having brought them Monies to carry on the War with, he could not but think it advisable to leave behind him Rules to conduct it with, which his Experience and Knowledge of the Country made him highly capable of giving ; and in a Council of War held at *Valencia*, Feb. 4. 1704. gave in writing his Opinion concerning the Management of the Campaign, which he would have had to be on the Defensive, and which, if carry'd on after that manner, would have hinder'd the dismal Effects of a contrary Judgment in a very few Months after, at the fatal Battle of *Almanza*, which was the Prelude to all our Misfortunes in that Country that have happen'd since.

His Lordship being sensible how things would go after his departure, but zealous to turn them another way, that the Advantages He had gain'd with so much Prudence might not be lost through the want of it in Others, wrote from *Turin* the 21st of *April* following, where, having urg'd the Necessity of a Defensive War to the *Portugese* Ambassador, and said, *I know my Reasons, tho' good, will have little force with the Generals ; They have the last Campaign in their thoughts, and have not perhaps the same Tranquility of Mind and Quiet which, I thank God, I enjoy. I am well assur'd that the Interest of your Country needs Precaution ; since your best Troops are in Spain, and that a Defeat must expose Portugal before Succours can arrive ; since England has left herself almost unprovided with Troops, and that the Forces in*  
Italy

*Italy being design'd for other Services, it will be difficult to obtain any of them, tho' the Circumstances pressingly require it. I therefore intreat your Excellency to think again of the Consequence of a lost Battle. God be prais'd you are not under a Necessity of a Victory; that is the Circumstance of France, &c. Whether the Portuguese follow'd this Advice or not, and voted against coming to a General Action, it is not in my power to determine; but this Letter from my Lord plainly shews how well the Author of it could judge of the Posture of their Affairs, and how reasonable it was to think of nothing but a Defensive War. My Lord, without all peradventure, wishes he had been mistaken in his Judgment; but in a few days after the writing of it, those who had no regard to what he foretold, took care most punctually to fulfil it.*

*As their not listning to his Lordship's Advice in Spain was the occasion of irretrievable Losses in that Kingdom, so it likewise prov'd of very pernicious Consequence to the Affairs in Italy, which had been so well concerted between the Duke of Savoy, Prince Eugene, and the E. of Peterborough; for by the means of the Defeat at Almanza, the French were able to make large Detachments from thence to Provence, which rendred the Siege of Toulon, that afterwards was so gloriously undertaken, of no effect.*

*His Lordship's stay in Italy was very short after the foregoing melancholly Accident; and tho' he lost no Time at the several Courts; he visited after his dismissal from the Command of the Army, in Consultations for the good of his Country in particular, and the whole Confederacy, he was very earnestly recall'd Home by the Ministry then in being, who were none of his best Friends; and was forc'd to leave a very worthy Son dangerously ill of his Wounds, and the Court of his Royal Highness of Savoy, where he was receiv'd with all possible marks of Distinction, for nothing like a Reception at that of Great Britain; so much was the Interest of his Enemies superior to his own. But*



But tho' he could have the favour of no other means to justify himself, than by the Press, and neither the Court, nor the House of Peers, thought fit to set his great and unparallel'd Services in a true Light, till the present Session of Parliament: His Lordship has had the Honour at last and very lately, to the no small disappointment of the *Faction*, not only to be publickly acquitted from having any share in the Mismanagements of the War in *Spain* or elsewhere, but very honourably Thank'd for discharging the Trusts repos'd in him with Zeal, Courage, and Fidelity; a Reward, though not answerable to the great Things he has done for us and our Allies, yet nothing short of the Manors of *Woodstock* and *Wooton*, if we consider the Dignity of that great Assembly that gave it. On which Occasion Sir *Symon Harcourt*, the Lord Keeper of the great Seal, address'd his Lordship as follows;

*My Lord Peterborough,*

" I am commanded by my Lords to return their  
 " Thanks to your Lordship, for your many Eminent  
 " and Faithful Services to your Queen and Country  
 " during your Command in *Spain*.

*My Lord,*

" The Thanks of this Illustrious Assembly is an Honour, which has been rarely pay'd to any Subject, but  
 " never, after a *stricter* enquiry into the Nature of any  
 " Service, upon a more *mature Deliberation*, or with  
 " *greater Justice*, than at this time to your Lordship.  
 " Such is your Lordship's known Generosity, and truly Noble Temper, that I assure my self the Present I  
 " am now offering to your Lordship, is the more acceptable as it comes *pure and unmix'd*, and is unattended with any *other Reward*, which your Lordship  
 " might justly think would be an Allay to it.

*My Lord,*

" Had more Days been allow'd me, than I had Minutes, to have call'd to mind the wonderful and amazing  
 " mazing

" mazing Success, which perpetually attended your  
 " Lordship in *Spain* (the Effect of your Lordship's Per-  
 " sonal Bravery and Conduct) I would not attempt the  
 " enumerating your particular Services, since I should  
 " offend your Lordship, by the mentioning of such as  
 " I could recollect, and give a just occasion to this Ho-  
 " nourable House, by my involuntary omission of the  
 " far greater part of them.

" Had your Lordship's Wise Counsels, particularly  
 " your Advice at the Council of War in *Valencia*, been  
 " pursued in the following Campaign, the fatal Battle  
 " of *Almanza*, and our greatest Misfortune which has  
 " since happen'd in *Spain*, had been prevented, and the  
 " Design upon *Thoulon* might have happily succeeded.  
 " I shall detain your Lordship no longer, than in  
 " Obedience to the Order I have receiv'd, to return  
 " your Lordship, as I do, the *Thanks of this House, for*  
 " *your eminent and remarkable Services to your Queen*  
 " *and Country, during your Command in Spain.*

His Lordship's Answer.

My Lords,

*For the great Honour I have receiv'd from your or d-*  
*ships, I return my most humble Thanks, with a Heart*  
*full of the truest Respect and Gratitude: No Service can*  
*deserve such a Reward. It is more than a sufficient Re-*  
*compence for any past Hardships, and to which nothing*  
*can give an Addition. I shall endeavour in all my fu-*  
*ture Actions, not to appear unworthy of the unmerited*  
*Favours I have this Day receiv'd from this great Assembly.*

Thus the Reader may see, that notwithstanding all  
 the Efforts of his Enemies, to render his Lordship's Ser-  
 vices of less Importance and Significance than they  
 were, they appear'd in their true Lustre; and that this  
 Noble Peer has this to Comfort him under the Un-  
 grateful Returns he before met with from a thankless  
 and ungenerous Party, that those who deny'd him the  
 just

just Rewards of his unwearied Application and Diligence for the Common Good, would have deny'd his Royal Mistress her self the Exercise of Her just Rights, and that he has no other Enemies to his extraordinary Merits, but such as are for lessening and impairing the Queen's ; since through vindicating the Prerogatives of Her Majesty, their Lordships have at last asserted the Privileges of a very deserving Subject.

What remains for me to do in the next Place, is to *Account* for my Title, by looking into the Merits of his Lordship the Earl of *Galloway*, that those who are not acquainted with his Actions may from hence be at liberty to judge, how much he falls short of the other Peer, or how near he comes up to him, for none can draw such a Conclusion as can make him excell him.

And here as we went through the Earl of *Peterborough's* Conduct from his very first Landing in *Spain*, till after his leaving it, so it is but necessary we should do the same by his Lordship, especially since the Transactions in *Spain* have such a dependence on those in *Portugal*, and are so closely interwoven with them. Wherefore, omitting the Dialogue between him and the Great Man at *Windsor*, which you'll find in the Annals of Queen *Anne* for 1704, I shall take him from his first Arrival in *Portugal*, where, having waited on the King, and been graciously receiv'd, he took a Review of the *Portuguese* and Auxiliary Forces, which were upwards of 18000 Men, and caus'd them to pass the little River *Coa*, and so encamp near *Almeida* on the 23d of *September*, 1704. It is observable the Two Kings, of *Spain* and *Portugal*, encourag'd this Royal Army with their Presence, with design to Invade *Castile*, but things were so carry'd (no doubt by the Prudence of the Generals) that when they came to the River *Agueda*, which they intended to pass near *Ciudad Rodrigo*, they found the opposite Banks so well guarded by the *Spaniards* under the Duke of *Berwick*, (whose Army was very near 9000 effective Men) that it was

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thought fit not to hazard the Loss of *double the Number*; and so retiring further into the Territories of *Portugal*, the Troops were sent into Quarters, *without any such thing, beyond all question, as the Earl of Gallway's Consent for their so doing*. As for the *Spaniards*, they were so weaken'd by the Battalions sent under the Command of the *Marquis de Villadarias*, to form the Siege of *Gibraltar*, that they held themselves to have Business enough on their hands to defend their own Country, and had no thoughts of invading *Portugal*; so that all things were wonderfully quiet on those Frontiers till the 24th of *April, 1705. N. S.*

The *Conde das Calveas*, a Grandee of *Portugal*, acted as Generalissimo, and under him the *Conde de la Corjoña*, the *Earl of Gallway*, and *Baron Fagel*, who commanded each other as Captain-Generals in their respective Turns for the space of a Week; the *Conde de Villaverde* being General of the Horse, and the *Viscount Barbacena* General of Artillery. The first day the Army made but a small March of a League and a half; on the 25th they march'd two whole Leagues; on the 26th and 27th they kept the same sort of pace; and on the 28th were muster'd, and found to consist of more than 24000 Men; the Train of Artillery being found to consist of 20 heavy Cannon, 24 Field-pieces, 7 great Mortars, and 10 small Mortars. The 29th the Army march'd a League and a half, and the next day advanc'd a League, and encamp'd in sight of *Albuquerque*. The 1st of *May* they march'd a League and a half, and encamp'd near *Vincento*, which having submitted the day before upon Terms, was plunder'd by the Foreigners. The 2d the Army having advanc'd two Leagues, arriv'd before *Valencia d'Alcantara*, which surrender'd after a stout Resistance on the 9th following, the Garison being made Prisoners of War. Note, General *Fagel* commanded this Week, so that the taking of this Town cannot, without manifest Injury to that Gentleman, be imputed to the *Earl of Gallway*.

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The Army decamp'd from *Alcantara* the 14th of *May* (N. S.) and encamp'd the same evening at *St. Vincent*, and the 17th came before *Albuquerque*; but the March being very long, they could not invest it till the 16th. On the 22d the Garison was allow'd to march out upon very honourable Terms, by the Earl of *Gallway*, who, instead of making them Prisoners of War by Force, endeavour'd to win their Affections by Treats, and allow'd them a Piece of Cannon not included in the Articles, as a particular and much-applauded Act of Generosity. This is look'd upon by his Lordship's Vindicator as a Master-piece in Politicks, to encourage other Towns to surrender as *cheaply* as this did, which cost so much Powder and Ball against it, that He himself says the Besiegers had but 200 Cannon-Ball left; tho' other People think it the only way to put Arms in their hand to make a Defence with.

The remaining part of the Season for this Summers Campaign was spent in Marches and Countermarches, Consults about the Siege of *Badajox*, but no Resolutions taken thereupon; wherefore the Army went into Quarters of Refreshment; though I should have told the Reader another remarkable Action that his Lordship had a share in, which was to send out 600 *English* and *Dutch* Horse to secure a Convoy of Provisions coming from *Campo Major*, that otherwise might have been in Danger; and that the *Mareschal de Tesse*, tho' he hover'd about this Camp with more than 2500 Horse at a time, did not dare to attack them, because they were so very much upon their Guard, through the wise Precautions of their Generals.

On the 30th of *October* following, after the Earl of *Gallway* had prevail'd with the Marquis *das Minas*, and the other General, to form the Siege of *Badajox*, all the Forces decamp'd, and rendezvous'd on the River *Coya*, and on the 3d of the following Month encamp'd before *Badajox*; the Trenches were open'd on the 4th, and daily reliev'd by the Troops of the several

Nations which the Army was compos'd of, till the 7th, when his Lordship thought fit to change the Disposition of the Army, by sending one half of the Forces over the *Guadiana*, to hinder the Enemy from throwing any Succours into the place. The 8th General *Fagel* arriv'd in the Camp. The 9th and 10th was spent by the Besiegers in making their Approaches, throwing Bombs into the Town, and firing upon it from three Batteries of Cannon. On the 11th a Bomb from the Town blew up the Powder at one of their Batteries, and several of the Gunners, whereupon the rest ran away. The Earl of *Galloway* and the Baron *de Fagel* repairing thither to remedy the Disorder, found the Platform spoil'd; and as they were upon the Battery to encourage the Soldiers, and had both their Arms lifted up, so that they touch'd one another, a Canon-Ball from the Old Castle came between them, and struck off the Right hand of my Lord *Galloway* a little below the Elbow; Whereupon General *Fagel* took upon him the Command of the Army as Campmaster-General under the Marquis *das Minas*, and on the 12th the Besiegers continu'd to fire with such Success, as they hop'd to be Masters of the Town by the 15th. The 13th a *French* Dragoon came over to them, and gave them to understand that the Enemy were marching to relieve the Town; and in the Night between the 13th and 14th two other Dragoons deserted, and made their Report that the Army was in motion, tho' two *Spanish* Troopers that were taken soon after contradicted it, and affirm'd that they were in their old Camp. Tho' they were within sight of the Confederate Army, soon after, and before the latter could come up with them, they pass'd the *Chevara* over a Stone-bridge, (which ought to have been broken down at the forming of the Siege) and drawing up their Army behind that River, with *Badajex* in their Reer, flung a Thousand Grenadiers into the Place, leaving the Confederates to retire to their Camp without being able to hinder the Relief of the Town, by a Body of Troops that

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was scarce a third part of their Number, it consisting only of 3000 Horse and 5000 Foot, when theirs was upwards of 24000 effective Men.

*Badajox* being thus reliev'd, the Besiegers withdrew their Artillery from the Batteries, and on the 17th decamp'd for *Elvas*, where they arriv'd the 19th following, and separated, and went into Winter-Quarters. Various were Opinions about this Disgrace; the Earl of *Galloway's* Friends imputed it wholly to General *Fagel*; and on the contrary, those that were Well-wishers to the General charg'd his Lordship with it, in the first place, because General *Fagel* was not at the Council of War, but on his way homeward when the Siege was undertaken, and in the second, because his Lordship had so disposed of the Troops, as to invest only part of the Town, instead of the whole. 'Tis true, the King of *Portugal* did his Lordship the Honour of a Letter of Condolance on the loss of his Arm, and the Queen his Mistress made him a Present upon that Disaster: But, as neither of these were of force enough to justify his Conduct with his Enemies, so many that were impartial in their Affections to either of the Two Generals, had very favourable Sentiments of the Baron *Fagel's* Vindication, which he caus'd to be printed, and which it will not be improper to insert upon this occasion.

S I R,

I Hope your Majesty will pardon the Boldness I take to prosecute my self at your Royal Feet, and give you, by these Lines a Relation of what pass'd the 14th Instant, when the Enemy threw Succours into *Badajox*.

Having obtain'd leave of their High Mightinesses to return to *Holland*, I thought to obtain the same Permission of your Majesty, when you order'd me to repair to the Army, which I found before *Badajox*. I arriv'd there four days after the Opening of the Trenches, which was done without having ruin'd, or possessed the Magazine the Enemy had at *Talavera*, two Leagues from the Front of your Majesty's Army, where was then but 3 or 4000 of their Troops, but they were considerably reinforc'd, when I arriv'd in the Army. I confess I was of Opinion, that it was advisable to quit the Siege for a time, in order to march to



to the Enemy, and drive them from a place that was so near us; but, contrary to my Advice, the Siege was carried on. In the mean time the Enemy, who were but two Leagues from your Majesty's Army, having their Right towards the River *Guadiana*, were daily reinforc'd, and your Majesty's Army, which had their Left towards the same River, were so far from being able to surround and invest the Town on all sides, that they did only cover the Trenches. The Generals of your Majesty's Horse were ordered to have constantly Parties abroad, to observe the Enemy's Motions; being so near them, we feared to be surpriz'd. The Earl of *Galway* having had the misfortune the 11th Instant to have his Hand shot off, the Function of Mestre de Camp fell to me. The 12th I gave the most exact Orders possible, that the Generals should have notice of any thing that might occasion an Alarm. I was willing also, by way of Precaution, to have made Works to hinder the Execution of the Enemy's Design, but it was too late. The Night between the 13th and 14th, at two in the Morning, we had Notice given us by two Deserters, that the Enemy were in motion since the Evening before, but they could not tell us on what side of the River they march'd. I advis'd immediately the assembling of all the Generals, but came to no Resolution; and it being fear'd the Enemy might march towards our Left, I propos'd to the Generals who were on Duty, that we should all repair to the Left, in order to take there the necessary Measures. No notice being taken of what I said, I resolv'd to go thither in Person, and being arriv'd there, the Generals gave me so many Assurances that the Enemy were not moving, that I return'd in hopes of meeting the Marquis *das Minas*. I was no sooner gone, than Intelligence was brought me, that the Enemy appear'd before our Posts. I dispatch'd immediately *Manuel d'Azevedo Fortes Tenente*, General under the Marquis *das Minas*, to give him notice that the Enemy were before our Flank, and desired him to joyn us forthwith. The *Sieur Manuel d'Azevedo Fortes*, has since reported to me, that he found the Marquis in his Quarters, that he mounted on Horseback immediately, and repaired to the Left, without loss of Time. I went my self, full Gallop, to Count *St. Juan's* Post on the other side the River, but did not arrive there, till the Van of the Enemy's Army had gain'd the Bridge on the *Chebra*, and and was already drawn up against us. I ask'd all the Generals and Experienc'd Officers, *viz.* Lieutenant General *Windham*, Major Generals *Harvey* and *Teghnagel*, Colonel *Baron* of *Winterfeld*, Count *St. Juan*, and Count *St. Vincent*, of your Majesty's Troops, if they thought it was still possible for me to pass the Army, and draw them up; but, by reason four Souldiers abreast only could pass over a Bridge, and that the two Fords were likewise very narrow, and the Channel of the River large,

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all the Generals and Officers unanimously concluded it could not be done, and that I ought to draw up the Army on the other side. Had the Generals thought it possible, I would have ventured to have pass'd some Troops, in order to draw them up before the Enemy's Front, and attack them; but it was highly probable they would not have suffered a Body of Troops, strong enough to fight them, to pass; and the Generals being of a contrary Opinion, I could not undertake to pass the Army against their Consent, and without the Approbation of the General in Chief. In the mean time I order'd Count St. *Juan* to prepare to withdraw his Troops, lest he should be driven into the River: I went to the other side of the River, to draw up the Troops that were already in motion to pass it, and waited on the Banks for the Arival of the Marquis *das Minas*, that I might follow his Directions. No time was lost; for the Troops that were still before the Camp moved on in order to pass the sooner. Hereupon the Marquis *das Minas* arriv'd, and the Troops were likewise in motion, in order to pass the River, and sustain one another: But the Artillery I had sent for was not yet arrived: The Marquis *das Minas* having heard my Report, did not only approve what I had done, but stay'd also above an Hour before he let the Army pass, in order to fall upon the Enemy's Rear.

Sir, I hope your Majesty will pardon me, if I leave it to the General in Chief to give your Majesty an Account of the rest that passed that day: yet, nevertheless, I have dispatch'd with the present, the Baron of *Winterfeld*, Colonel in my Masters Armies, who is a skilful and experienc'd Officer, and was present in all that happen'd, in case your Majesty will be inform'd of some Particulars.

Sign'd,

The Baron de F A G E L.

News being brought to *Portugal* of the great Preparations made by the Court of *Madrid* against that of *Barcelona*, and their Resolutions to besiege that City, it was propos'd in a Council held at *Lisbon*, the King and the Chief Generals present, to make a Diverſion in *Spain*, and hinder King *Philip* from streightning the Affairs of King *Charles*. In order to this, it was resolv'd to open the Campaign with the Siege of *Alcantara*. Accordingly the Troops left their Garisons to form the Army. The greatest Body, which was encamp'd near *Elvas*, between the *Caya* and *Cayala*, march'd on the last day

day of *March* (N.S.) to *Salvador*, the 2d of *April* to *Mayorga*, and the 3d to *St. Vincent*, where the several Bodies join'd, to the number of 26 *Portuguese* Battalions, 5 *English*, 4 *Dutch*; 36 *Portuguese* Squadrons, 2 *English*, and 4 *Dutch*; being provided with 24 Pieces of Heavy Cannon for Battery, 12 Field Pieces, Provisions for 24 Days, and Waggons and Carriages in proportion. The 4th of *April* the Army advanc'd to *Membrilla's*, and encamp'd near the River *Selr*. The 5th and 6th was taken up in levelling the Roads and passing the River. The 7th it was resolv'd to attack the Duke of *Berwick*, who was encamped at *Brocas*, and might have been entirely defeated, but for the Confederates being unacquainted with the Ground in those Parts: So that the Rear was only put to flight, and ten of its Squadrons overthrown. The Army rested themselves the 8th at *Brocas*, and march'd on the 9th towards *Alcantara*, into which the Duke of *Berwick* had three days before thrown 7 Battalions, and which was formally Besieg'd on the tenth; the Trenches being open'd on the same Night. The Garrison surrenderd themselves Prisoners of War on the 16th, and march'd out at the Breach, headed by *Don Miguel de Gualco*, Marechal de Camp, and *Don Diego d'Avila*, Brigadier, in all 3282 Men. The 19th the Marquiss de *Frontire* made the Garrison of *Moraleja*, another fortify'd Town, likewise surrender at Discretion after a Siege of three Days: It consisted of 400 Regular Troops, under the Command of a French Governor; and on the 23d *Don Juan d'Atayda* did the same by *Coria*, and secur'd the Magazines just at the time that Mr. *Jessoreville* was advancing that way with 12 Squadrons to burn the Ovens and Stores the Enemy had in the Place. The Army broke up from *Coria* the 26th, and on the 27th reach'd *Gallistro*, a little Town with pretty good Walls and a Castle, belonging to the Conde of that Name. The 28th they encamp'd at *Placentia*, where a Council of War was held about the farther Ope-



Operations of the Campaign, and the Earl of *Galloway* insisted to march directly to *Madrid*, to which the *Portuguese* would by no means consent, as believing *Barcelona* to be lost, by reason of its being besieg'd by the *French*; and being of opinion that they ought to improve the Time, and possess themselves of the places upon the Frontiers before the Duke of *Berwick* was join'd by the Reinforcements he expected from *France*. However, they march'd as far as *Almaraz*, and destroy'd the Bridge there, that the Enemy might have no passage over that River from *Alcantara* to *Ponte de Arco-bispo*.

Here another Council of War was held, the Result of which was to march into *Old Castile*, and attack *Ciudad Rodrigo*, from whence they might advance towards *Madrid* through *Salamanca*, in case they had News of the raising the Siege of *Barcelona*. On the 10th of *May* Don *Joseph Belois*, a Gentleman of one of the best Families in *Valencia*, arriv'd in the Camp from the Earl of *Peterborough*, with Advice, "That the Siege would draw  
" out into length, from the Difficulties the Enemy met  
" with, and would very probably be rais'd at the ap-  
" proach of the Confederate Fleet, which would make  
" it impossible for them to retreat through *Aragon*,  
" and oblige them to fetch a great Compass through  
" *France*: wherefore he desir'd my Lord *Galloway* to  
" march directly to *Madrid*, where he should be join'd  
" as soon as possible by all the Forces that were on that  
" side". But this Message, which shews that there was no want of Correspondence on the side of the Earl of *Peterborough*, made no impression on the *Portuguese*; they would march backward to *Ciudad Rodrigo*, which they invested the 21st of *May*, and possess'd themselves of by Articles on the 26th, that oblig'd the Garison not to bear Arms for the space of a Year. On the 27th the Generals receiv'd the News of the raising the Siege of *Barcelona*, whereupon it was unanimously resolv'd to march towards *Madrid*. The decamp'd from *Ciudad*  
E *Rodrigo*

*Rodrigo* the 2d of *June*, and arriv'd the 7th at *Salamanca*, from whence the Duke of *Berwick* retir'd towards the Pass of *Guadarama*. From thence they sent a Detachment to possess themselves of *Alva de Tormes*, and put a Garison in the Castle; and on the 12th left *Salamanca*, and march'd towards the Pass of *Guadarama*, taking *Peneranda* in their way, where they receiv'd Deputies from *Segovia*. The 17th the Army encamp'd at *Villacarferi*, where they erected Ovens and a Magazine under a Guard of One Battalion. The 18th they came to *Espinal*, where Deputies from the *Escorial* came to offer their Submission, and on the 23d pass'd the Mountain at the *Puerta de Guadarama*, and encamp'd near the Village of that Name, within a League and a half of the *Escorial*. The 24th the Army encamp'd at *Nuestra Señora de Rata-mal*, where they receiv'd Deputies from *Madrid*, sent from the Nobility, Corrigidor, and all Persons of Note, and where likewise the Earl of *Galloway* receiv'd Letters from King *Charles* and the Count *Noyelles*, importing, *That my Lord Peterborough had embarqu'd the Infantry for Valencia, where the King was to join him with all the Cavalry, and then march towards Madrid.*

On the 27th the Allies encamp'd near *Madrid* on the Banks of the *Mansanares*, where most of the persons of Distinction in that City came to see them, and caus'd King *Charles* to be proclaim'd in that City three days after; which had effect upon several Towns, amongst which *Toledo* was the first, and Cardinal *Portacarero*, the Archbishop of it, wrote to the Marquis *das Minas*, and the Conde *de la Corfona*, assuring them in exprefs Terms of his Obedience to that Prince. On the 7th of *July* my Lord *Galloway* sent the Captain of the Hussars and 30 Troopers to the King by the way of *Valencia*, to press his Majesty to join the Army at *Madrid*; which Commander, tho' he lost most of his Men by the Peasants in his March, reach'd the King, *without any Letters for the Earl of Peterborough, because it was reasonable to suppose that his Lordship was with the King;*

King ; and, upon that supposition, according to the Rules of War and Decency, he thought that out of Respect to his Majesty he ought to send Him all the Intelligence and to Him only. The 8th brought the Confederates News of the Revolt of the greatest part of those places in Old Castile that had declar'd for them, which retarded the coming up of the Convoy of Provisions the Allies expected, cut off their Communication with Portugal (an unpardonable Neglect), and hinder'd them from receiving any more Corn from the Conquer'd Country. The Inhabitants of *Mancha* soon after took up Arms in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*, and the City of *Toledo* declar'd for, and proclaim'd Him again. These Considerations, back'd with their want of Provisions at *Madrid*, where those they had contracted with to furnish them with Bread, fail'd in the Performance, and the Murmurs of the Inhabitants who seem'd One and All in another Interest, induc'd the Confederates to decamp from thence and march to *Alcala*, that they might be nearer their own Provisions, which they did on the 11th of the same Month, and at the same time sent some Detachments towards the *Mancha*, in order to reduce the Rebels ; One of which consisting of 200 Horse and 300 Foot, was oblig'd to fight a Body of Foot at *Quintanar*, and tho' they defeated them, did it with the loss of a Colonel of Horse, who commanded the Party, five Captains, and fifty private Men.

The 15th of *July* the Confederate Generals march'd with the Horse and Foot of the first Line to *Guadalaxara*, upon account (as they gave out) of the goodness of the Air and Water, the conveniency of Forrage, and the advantageousness of that Post ; from whence they sent the Quarter-Master General, *du Bourguet*, to the King at *Saragossa*, to hasten his March to the Army ; and having receiv'd an Answer to their Message, that the King was to be at *Molina* in *Arragon* on the 28th, and desir'd them to cover his March, that was to be within thirteen Leagues of the Enemy, they laid the Project



which had been concerted to secure and fortifie *Toledo*, aside, and resolv'd to march towards the Enemy at *Xadraque*, which they did ; and having recall'd their second Line from *Alcola*, and being arriv'd near it, found the Van of the Enemy's Army marching towards them, who *re-pass'd the Defiles as soon as they perceiv'd the Allies* ; but the Country was so difficult, that it was not possible to come to a general Engagement, and therefore the Armies did only Canonade each other, and Skirmish for two Days.

The Enemy's Camp being daily reinforc'd from *France*, the Confederates thought of returning to *Guadalaxara*, and encamp'd the 31st at *Junquiera*, and were follow'd by the Enemy, who encamp'd within two Leagues of them. On the 1st of *August* they march'd from thence towards *Guadalaxara*, but *lost their Communication with Portugal, by not posting themselves behind the Caruma ; and marching from thence near Guadalaxara*, and observing that the Enemy design'd to force them to a general Engagement, put the River *Hennares* between the Enemy and themselves. The 2d of *August* the Duke of *Berwick* came, and encamp'd before the Allies, and on the 3d repossess'd themselves of *Madrid*, making some Miquelets that were left to Garrison the Castle, Prisoners of War.

To proceed : On the 6th, King *Charles*, attended by the Earl of *Peterborough* and the other Generals, join'd the Army at *Guadalaxara* with his Regiment of yellow Dragoons, which made four Squadrons ; another of Horse of *Don Pedro Moras*, making also four Squadrons in a very good condition ; and three compleat Battalions, one *Italian* in his Majesty's Pay, and two *Dutch* ; which were follow'd two Days after by three Battalions more, one of *Castilians*, the other *Germans*, and the Royal Regiment of *Raby's* Dragoons, making three Squadrons, and that of *Pierce* one ; which could not put them in a condition to go in quest of the Enemy, who were superior in Number to them (*but by whose Fault ?*) both in Horse and Foot.

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The Earl of *Peterborough* stay'd but a very little Time with the Army, but left it (*as my Lord Gallway's Vindicator gives out*) on account of the Marquis *das Minas* his refusal to share the Command according to his Proposal; which, if true, adds very much to the Praise of the former, who would not submit to let the *Portuguese* take the Post of Honour of the *English*, out of their own Country, as that Lord did. To proceed, the Confederates having consum'd the Provisions and Forage gather'd at *Guadalaxara* in six Days after his Majesty's arrival, (*a great Token of their Preparations for the reception of him and his Troops*) thought fit to March for *Chincon*, where they arriv'd the 14th of *August*, and continu'd a whole Month, nothing of Moment happening but some Skirmishes with the Enemy, which often happened to the disadvantage of the former, since the Peasants always gave them wrong Intelligence, on account of their willingness to get rid of them, which is an argument likewise of the *strict Discipline* they are said to have kept.

At length the Confederate-Generals saw there were no hopes of receiving any more Reinforcements either from *Portugal*, or from the Earl of *Peterborough* (who is falsely said, in the *Lord Gallway's Account*, to have had 13 Battalions in *Valencia*, when the whole Body of Forces, *English* and other, amounted to no more than nine hundred Men), they resolv'd to pass the *Tagus*, which they did the 14th of *September*, and were join'd by General *Wyndham* with three Battalions and a Regiment of Horse, all of my Lord *Peterborough's* raising, as likewise seasonably supply'd with Bread, Bisket, and other Provisions for the Army, which his Lordship had generously accepted of in lieu of 10000 *l.* the Town of *Hueta* would have presented him with for the loss of his Equipage and Baggage.

The Enemy pass'd the *Tagus* at the same Time at *Aranjuez* with all their Forces; and with a strong Body of Horse observ'd, and endeavour'd to disturb t

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March of the Allies; but they never found an opportunity to attack them with Advantage: So that at last the latter pass'd the *Xucar* near *Vilverdo*, from whence they march'd to *Montila*, and thence to *Peral*, where they stay'd 'till the 25th, when the Duke of *Berwick* being inform'd that they were to march thro' a Plain to *Iniesta*, in order to draw near the *Xabriel*, drew all his Forces together, and advanc'd with so great diligence in the Night, that his Van appear'd in the Plain just as they began their March; upon which, the Earl of *Galloway* (*tho' the King and the Marquis das Minas was there*) made the necessary Dispositions for a Battle, and with such a presence of Mind conducted the Army over the *Xabriel* in so good Order, that the Enemy durst not attack them. After this remarkable and successful March, the Confederate Army took their Quarters from *Requena* to *Denia*, having posted themselves at *Cofrentes*, and put a Garrison into *Cuenca* (*which had not been done but for Count Noyelles's Advice*), whereby they preserv'd an entrance into *Castile*, and at the same Time were able to protect those Countries that had before submitted to King *Charles*, who for the same Purpose sent most of his own Troops into *Arragon*.

The Earl of *Peterborough* being return'd from *Italy*, and having perform'd his Commissions for Money with success, gave his Opinion in a Council of War held at *Valencia* the 15th of *January*, 1704. for the Confederates to be upon the Defensive, (as has been already said in that part of this Narrative that more particularly belongs to him) but by the majority of the Generals, contrary to the Sentiments of his Catholick Majesty, the *Portuguese* Ambassador, and the Count *Noyelles*, it was resolv'd to act Offensively; which the Earl of *Rivers* perceiving at his arrival with the Forces from *England*, declin'd making any Stay with them, and in a few Days after Landing, sail'd homewards, accompanied by the Earl of *Essex* and Brigadier General *Gorges*.

What

What Effect those unpremeditated Resolutions had, may be seen by the fatal Battle of *Almanza*, that was fought on the 25th of *April* following, and which might have been avoided, had the Earl of *Galloway* not sided with the *Portuguese*; first, in the attack of the Castle of *Villena*, which was of little or no significance; and afterwards, falling upon an Enemy that was superior to them, not only in Number but the Goodness of Troops, after they had been join'd by 10000 of the best Soldiers in *France*: But as the successful March that was made in sight of the *French* and *Spanish* Army before, was wholly to be imputed to the Earl of *Galloway*, so now his Lordship's Vindicator is so dextrous as to thrust off the misfortunes of this Battle upon the Marquis *das Minas*.

After this Defeat, from which his Lordship did not bring off 2500 effective Men, he retreated with the remains of the *English* and *Dutch* Horse to *Alegra*, and having left a Garrison in that Place and in *Xativa*, *Denia* and *Alicant*, march'd with the *Portuguese* Cavalry, that sav'd themselves by flight, to the other side of the *Ebro* near *Tortosa*, in order to join the rest of King *Charles's* Forces, and defend the Province of *Catalonia*. The result of this unfortunate Campaign was the loss of the Kingdom of *Valencia*, the strong Town of *Lerida*, and the raising the Siege of *Toulon*, which was done by Forces from *Roussillon*, which could not have been spar'd, had the Confederates only acted upon the Defensive.

Whom the Loss of this Battle may be imputed to, may be seen by the following Letters.

*Letter of the Count of Cardona's from Valencia, May 2. 1707.*

**W**E find our selves at this time full of Regret by reason of the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, which might have been easily avoided, could the eagerness of the Earl of *Galloway* have been diverted; but the Matter was carried so far, that neither  
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the several Advices of the Officers the Day before, nor those of the Country People, which confirmed the former, were of any Effect towards making him alter his Design. However the greatest Fault consisted not in rejecting the several Informations given him, but in not falling upon the Enemies Flank, which might have been done easily. This Oversight, together with the great Interval in the middle of the main Body, gave the Enemy an Opportunity to improve it to their own Advantage, and wholly to cut off our Right Wing, the Consequence of which was, that all the Cavalry fell upon the Infantry, now totally abandoned, and cut them all in peices.

This unhappy Accident may justly make us fear more fatal Consequences than at present we can well imagine.

*The Letter of Brigadier Drinborn's to Count de Noyelles.*

My Lord,

I Doubt not but the Baron *Friesheim* hath already transmitted unto your Excellency a Relation of the unfortunate Battle of *Almanza*; which was such, that it's impossible for me to give your Excellency an exact account of it. We quitted the Siege of the Castle of *Villena* on the 23d, having receiv'd Intelligence that the Enemy's Army was come to *Almanza*; and on the same Day, after we had withdrawn our Men and Cannon, we marcht the 24th as far as *Candette*; and after a Resolution had been taken to attack the Enemy, notwithstanding their Superiority, who encamped four Leagues from us, we began our *March* the 25th early in the Morning with such Expedition, that by Noon we entred the Plain, by a place call'd the Tower of *Don Henry*, and found the Enemy had not decamp'd, as we flatter'd our selves they would. We also found that their Army was joyn'd, and much stronger than ours: However we persisted in the Resolution to fight them; and our Army advancing on the Plain towards *Almanza*, my Lord *Gallway* with a Detachment possessed himself of some rising Ground, less than a Mile and a half distant from the Enemies Front; from whence he could see their Army drawn up in order of Battle, having the Town of *Almanza* in the Rear of their main Body; which was so posted, that the Second Line was near the Walls, extending its right Wing on a rising Ground, and the left into a great Plain, having three Lines to the Wings, which were very close. We were commanded to extend ourselves more and more towards the left; and seeing we were too weak to equal their Front, this Wing was reinforced with *das Minas's* Horse, that were drawn from the Second Line, which yet would not do: And as my Lord *Gallway's* Design was, he being then on our left, to hem in the Enemies right, by keeping us

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to extend our selves as we marched towards the left, with so much Precipitancy, without taking notice, that we did thereby make large intervals between our main Body and the Wings; yet we still prest on; and about Three the Fight began towards the left: The Enemy soon broke the *English* and *Portuguese* Dragoons, but they rallied again. The main Body came to engage at the same time, so far as the *Portuguese*, who continued in the Rear, and our Infantry penetrated through the Enemies Body, who were destitute of Horse to support them. I sustained the left Wing with the first Squadron of my own Regiment; we broke in upon them, and all that Battalion were made Prisoners, and their Colours taken by my Troopers; At the same time two other of the Enemies Battalions, that they might succour their main Body which was then on the Rout, took my Squadron in Flank, whose Fire we bore, and then were obliged to succour the Battallion of *Welderens*, who fought with their wonted Courage. The *Portuguese* did not come on all the while, but we saw their Horse on the Right, who fell upon Two or Three Squadrons. There was at that time on the Left no more than *de Nudes* and One or Two Battalions more. the Two Squadrons of *Harvey*, and my second Squadron, with the *Dutch* Dragoons, who being attacked by a treble Line of Foot and Horse, yet stood their Ground; But the Infantry, after they had rallied three times, were broke in upon by the Enemy, and almost all cut to pieces; so that our Troops being now routed on all sides by the Flight of the Left Wing, we found it very difficult to save the Remainder of my Regiment, that of the Dragoons, and that of *Harvey's*, after we had charged several times. In the mean time the Count *de Dona* had rallied the Remains of Fourteen Regiments, and we were informed next Day that he was retired to the Hills of *Don Henry*, and entrenched himself there, I went out with a small Detachment beyond *Catina*, because they flatter'd my Lord *Gallway* that he would defend himself still if he had but Provisions. The Intention was to endeavour the relief of those Troops; but I soon learnt, that upon Summons they had surrendered, though upon a formal Capitulation, which was confirmed Yesterday by Count *Dona* and several other Officers. It is strange that so small a Body should for so long a time resist the great Number of the Enemy; and some have assured me, that the Prisoners taken in this Place did not exceed 1500 Men. As for the rest of our Infantry, we have no more here than those who guarded the Baggage, the Sick and the Wounded in the Action at *Catina*. I have found 147 recovered of their Wounds; this is the sad Condition of our Army. We shall leave some Men in Garrison here, and for the rest I cannot tell what they will do, or how they will save themselves. There is still above 100 good Horse in my Regiment, and several wounded. Certainly there was never such a

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piece of Work as we have made of it. I was not of the Council of War, as not having received my Commission for a General Officer ; but I cannot understand how those who have been the Cause of this Misfortune can answer it. However, I shall not enlarge upon this Head, but wish I could speak in Person to your Excellency ; there is an absolute Necessity for it, and to that end I endeavoured to go towards *Catalonia* ; but the Baron *de Friesheim* refusing me that Liberty, this has put me upon writing in this manner, being very sorry I could not do it sooner. The Evil is irretrievable, and I look upon our Affairs to be ruined ; and I am afraid, when I consider the State and Management of our Affairs, that they will be attended with fatal Consequences. The Recruits are sent towards *Tortosa*, and Monsieur *Friesheim* told me that he would have them incorporated with our *Aragon* Batallions. Your Excellency knows much better than I after what manner, if it be possible, this Misfortune may be redressed. My Lord *Gallway* has a broken Pate, *Das Minas* is Sick, and *Friesheim* knows not what to do in this Exigency. I wish I could have sent better News to your Excellency, but God has ordered it otherwise, and the Blindness of our People was the Occasion of it.

*Alcira, April the 30th. 1707.*

*A Secret Letter to the States of M. Schonenberg, June 1. 1707.*

My Lords,  
**T**HOU' I do not doubt but their High Mightinesses shall have e'er this Time received a very exact and particular Account of what happened in the disgraceful Battle of *Albano*, yet I am of Opinion they will by no means find the Circumstances and Particulars mentioned in the Three Letters hereunto be superfluous. That under the Letter *A.* is an Original of the Count *de Noyelle*, writ to me, accompanied with a full Relation of the Action under *B.* transmitted to his Excellency by Brigadier *Drinborn*, and the other under *C.* is an Extract and Translation of the Remarks made by the Count *Cordona* Governor of the Kingdom of *Valencia*, on my Lord *Gallway's* Conduct, in a Letter to King *Charles's* Minister residing here. From all which it plainly appears with what little Coherence, and how indiscreet Counsel a Resolution so unnecessary, and yet of the highest importance, was undertaken ; with what blind Zeal and Confusion they carried it on, and with what fatal Success it was attended. It's also very remarkable, that we have not yet received in this Place as much as one Scrip of Paper either from the Marquess *Das Minas*, the Earl of *Gallway*, or the Baron *de Friesheim* ; which makes us imagine, that the Two last,



at least my Lord *Gallway*, has sent directly an ample Relation of the Fight, by a Frigate, into *England*. To this give me leave only to subjoin that by the several Advices we have received from very good Hands. out of divers Quarters, the Confusion among the respective Generals was so great, that they were almost all cut to pieces, and the unbroken *Portuguese* Cavalry, left the Kingdom of *Valentia*, and retired towards *Tortosa* without disputing the Passage of the River *Joncar* with the Enemy, who have already penetrated as far as *Valentia*; and in all appearance the Garrison left in the Castle of *Alicant* cannot long hold out against them. In the mean time his Majesty has dispatch'd the Marquess *l'Fuencalada*, a *Spanish* Gentleman, into *Italy*, to solicit for a speedy and strong Reinforcement of Foot and Dragoons; with which the Imperial Court, notwithstanding the pressing necessity of it, and the Conveniency arising from the Nearness of the Expedient, perhaps has no Inclination to comply with, will presume it to be against their own particular Interests in *Italy*, unless their High Mightinesses and the Queen of *Great Britain* go roundly to work to hasten such a Reinforcement so greatly wanted in *Spain*. The same Marquess is also ordered, after he has concluded his Business with the Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene*, to set forwards for the *Hague* and *London*, to represent the urgent Necessity of quick Supplies. As for this Court, they have been so far from employing what Forces they have on this Side, to make a speedy and vigorous Diversion in order to stop the Enemy; that they on the contrary countermanded and sent back those Troops that were on the March from the Province of *Alentaja* to reinforce the Body of the Army about *Zuidad Rodrigo*, in order to cover, as much as possible, the Frontiers of *Algarve*, where the Enemies little Flying Camp under the Duke *d'Offuna* have taken the Town of *Serna*. Moreover, since the forementioned little Army is augmented to about 5000 Men, Horse and Foot, though chiefly Militia; and make a shew of penetrating farther; I do my utmost by continual Representations to the Court to let them see, that by the junction of these Troops, and the Operations of such a Body of Men, the Frontiers on this side may not only be sufficiently secur'd, but also that this only Succour, which is yet at Hand, may seasonably contribute to retrieve our Affairs, against the Progress of the Enemy in *Valencia* and elsewhere, and oblige them to divide their Force for the Defence of their own Country; but that, on the contrary, by separating of this Army, they would be so far from covering the Frontiers of *Portugal*, that the Enemy would with more facility attack and master the remote Quarters one after another, and even penetrate into the Heart of *Portugal*, without the least Stop or Di-



version given to the Operations of their Grand Army against King Charles. All these, and several other convincing Arguments, make no Impression upon the timorous and obstinate Counsels of the Ministers, who content themselves with protesting, that if *England* and the States do not send over speedy and large Succours, they shall not only be incapable here, of making a Diversion in favour of the *Common Cause*, but likewise be unable to defend and secure themselves. I have so evidently set forth the cool Temper of this Council every Post, that it would be superfluous to trouble their High Mightinesses any more about it. Wherefore I recommend my self to their Favour, and leave it to their great Prudence, and their Knowledge in Matters of State, and exemplary Zeal, to find out Expedients proper for the Good of the *Common Cause*, and the Service of our Country.

Count de Noyelle's Letter to Mr. Schonenberg.

My Lord,  
**T**HE Letter you did me the Honour to write to me on the 29th of *March*, came to my Hands; and I have communicated to the King your Thoughts, in relation to what we may expect on the side of *Portugal*. You will be surpriz'd with the bad News contain'd in the Papers I do herewith send you.

It's matter of Amazement, to find People, without any Reason or Necessity, march four Leagues to find out an Enemy much stronger than themselves, very advantageously posted, and eager to engage; to alter the Scheme that had been laid and approv'd of by the King, that the Army should march into *Aragon*, where there were Magazines already provided; where his Majesty was to act in Person; and where being joined with 2000 Horse under the Command of Count de les Poëbla, and 3 Dutch Battalions, they should have been at least equal to the Enemy.

But what will surprize you the more is, that from the \* 25th of the last Month, on which the Battle of *Almanza* was fought, to this very Day [May 6.] there has been no Account transmitted to the King from the General, which makes me believe they do not know what Turn to give it.

In short, my Lord, they have play'd the Fool with themselves, and we suffer here for it.

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\* There is scarce such an Instance of Neglect as this to be met with in History; and 'tis the more so, because the distance between *Almanza* and *Barcelona*, is not above 250 Miles.

You may well imagine how they have expos'd the Army and the King there; never did this Prince shew more Constancy than now, making a Virtue of Necessity; he has sent for a Reinforcement of Foot from *Italy*.

The Frontiers of *Valencia* and *Aragon* are in great danger; and if, with the remains of their Army, they do not defend the Passages of the River *Guadarrama*; the First is lost, and the other Kingdom wherein there is no tenable Post, will be much exposed: We have not been wanting to make necessary Remonstrances to them, the result of which we do not yet know.

It has been propos'd to send the *Dutch* and *Portuguese* Recruits, which were not in the Battle, to *Valencia* and *Tortosa*.

It is absolutely necessary, that a Diversion should be made on the side of *Portugal*, by which means the Enemy will be oblig'd to re-call the Troops which they drew from thence to this Frontier.

Finally, my Lord, we will do what possibly we can; tho' after all, our best will be bad enough.

I'll let you know the Consequences of such extravagant Management, and what Reason my Lord *Galloway* can give for his so extraordinary Conduct.

*Barcelona, May 6.*

1707.

*I am,*

*C. de Noyelle.*

In the Year 1708, the Earl of *Galloway* being recall'd from *Spain* to his Embassy in *Portugal*, did not go into the Field on account of the ill state of his Health: But next Spring (1709.) the Confederate Army under the Marquis de *Fronteira's* and his Lordship's Command, having taken the Field about the end of *April*, came to an Engagement with the Forces under the Marquis de *Bay* on the 7th of *May*, where the latter with 5000 Horse, took three *English* Regiments Prisoners, with their commanding Officers, five Pieces of Cannon, and great part of the Army's Baggage, after putting the *Portuguese* to flight, and making his Lordship and his Secretary, Colonel *Bladen*, who both narrowly escap'd being taken Prisoners, ride four Leagues about, 'till at last they join'd the Run-away Army near *Elvas*.

Upon this uninterrupted course of Misfortunes, his Vindicator says, his Lordship desir'd to be recall'd, and the

the Queen having at last granted his request, and appointed the Earl of *Portmore* to succeed him in the Command of the *British* Forces in *Portugal*, my Lord *Gallway* sail'd for *England*, as soon as he heard his Successor was ready to embark; and arriving in *London*, had the Honour to kiss the *Queen's* Hand at *St. James's*, and met with a very gracious Reception.

Though that he has not had the same Honour from the House of Peers, may be seen from their Lordships late Representation to Her Majesty, where that his Lordship is not faultless, appears in his being charg'd jointly with the Lord *Tyrawly* and General *Stanhope*, for insisting in a Conference held at *Valencia* some time in January, 1704, in the presence of the King of Spain, and Her Majesty's Name being us'd in maintainance of their Opinion for an Offensive War, contrary to the King of Spain's Opinion, and that of all the General Officers, and Publick Ministers there (except the *Mirquis das Minas*), and the Opinion of the Earl of *Gallway*, Lord *Tyrawly*, and General *Stanhope*, being pursu'd in the Operations of the following Campaign, was the unhappy occasion of the Battle of *Almanza*, and one great Cause of our Misfortunes in Spain, and of the Disappointments of the Duke of *Savoy's* Expedition before *Toulon*, concerted with Her Majesty.

It is likewise represented by their Lordships to Her Majesty, That as the Earl of *Gallway* has, in yeilding the Post of Her Majesty's Troops to the Portuguese in Spain, acted contrary to the Honour of the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, so they find the Earl of *Peterborough*, during the Time he had the Honour of Commanding the Army in Spain, did perform many great and eminent Services, and if the Opinion he gave in the Council of War at *Valencia* had been follow'd, it might very probably have prevented the Misfortunes that have since happen'd in Spain, &c.

Yet

Yet, though their Lordships have not thought fit to give this Noble Person Thanks, or the same Acknowledgments as they have done to the Illustrious Earl of *Peterborough*; since a very able Pen has congratulated him upon his ill Successes, after a very artful Manner; and it is not in my Power to present the Reader with any thing in Prose, like what has been said by the present Lord Keeper, in favour of his Antagonist, I think it not foreign to the purpose to conclude with the following most excellent Poem, which will shew how ready I am to make use of any Materials that are conducive to his Lordship's Praise, tho' I cannot allow them for his Justification.

*To the Lord Gallway, occasion'd by the unfortunate Battle of Almanza.*

**R**epine not, Sir, at Fortune's partial Laws,  
Who often frowns upon the juster Cause:  
The Lawrel-wreath, with like deserv'd Renown,  
May both the Victor and the Vanquish'd crown;  
Nor mourn the swift Vicissitudes of Fate,  
That Name should reach you what attends the Great.  
Successful Acts depend not on the Will,  
And Virtue, though 'tis crost, is Virtue still.

Think on *Rome's* Eagles by *Marcellus* led,  
Think on the *Fabii* and *Emilius* dead,  
Who to their Country sacrificing all,  
Rose by Defeat, and triumph'd in their Fall.  
Will not Great *William's* Fame outlast the Sun?  
And has not *Luxemburgh* a Battle won?  
*Churchill*, 'tis own'd, ne'er yielded to a Foe;  
But *Pompey* was o'ercome, and *Cesar* too.  
Apply, great Sir, these just Examples Home,  
Britain can ne'er be more ingrate than *Rome*.

Fate's dark Decrees did that black Day ordain,  
That Wrong should triumph, and Oppression reign;

Num.



Yet *Gallway* long 'gainst Numbers kept the Field,  
 Numbers by *Mars* led on, by *Jove* upheld,  
 With Fury so heroically gear,  
 Repell'd the Torrent, and disputed Fate,  
 So well the *Chief* and *Soldier* did maintain,  
 That Victory was partial long in vain:  
 The Gods suspected much their own Decree,  
 And Fate grew doubtful of her Destiny.

Thy honest Wounds will testify thy Fame,  
 And show, tho' Fortune waves, that thou'rt the same.  
 Wounds deck the Hero with distinguish'd Grace,  
 And write the best Encomium in his Face.  
 From those red Monuments of Fame we're taught,  
 To think of nothing but how *Gallway* fought.  
 We view no more *Almanza* with Regret,  
 But in his Deeds our Country's Loss forget.

The Painter's Pencil may with artful Care  
 Nicely describe the Prelude of a War,  
 Or set the Hero in a glorious Light,  
 Eager of Fame, and burning for the Fight:  
 But who can tell the Vigilance and Pain  
 That fill'd thy Breast, and work'd thy lab'ring Brain;  
 Busy to act the General's better Part,  
 And to supply the Want of Force with Art?  
 What Hand can paint those unexampled Toils,  
 That mock'd the Victor's Arms, and sham'd his Spoils;  
 That could retrieve that gallant slaughter'd Host,  
 Which *British* Arms *unaided* had not lost?

*Berwick* could now more humble Thoughts endure,  
 In Victory it self but ill secure.  
 The Warrior's Wreath he drop'd, and blush'd to own  
 The fruitless Trophies he so late had won.

Is this the Harvest which my Lawrels bear,  
 And do my boasted Triumphs vanish here?  
 Are these th' Effects of slaughter'd Foes? *He said.*  
 Thus *Pyrrhus* vanquish'd, and thus *Pyrrhus* fled.  
 What means this Riddle in the conquering Cause?  
 Or sure my Fancy gives my Judgment Laws,

And

And never such a Scene of Triumph rose,  
 Or *Hydra's* are renew'd in *British* Foes,  
 Or some nocturnal Phantom *France* deceives,  
 And decks my Brow with visionary Wreaths.  
 Not so. Unerring *Gallway's* prudent Aim  
 Retards the Progress of my growing Fame  
 He still determines all Events in Ours,  
 To cross my Measures, and advance his own;  
 And, as to Nutriment Men Poisons turn,  
 Makes ev'n malignant Planets kindly burn.  
 Such Praise I must (however too severe  
 The Sound may prove in Royal *Philip's* Ear)  
 On my great Adversary's Worth bestow,  
 And love the Warrior, tho' I hate the Foe.

He spoke, and did the adverse Chief behold;  
 With Valour cautious, and with Caution bold;  
 Busy his sharer'd Legions to repair,  
 And give a different Prospect to the War:  
 Industrious each commodious Ground to gain,  
 And watchful to redeem *Almanza's* Plain.  
 So when fierce *Hannibal* (his Foes o'ercome)  
 Insulted *Italy*, and threatned *Rome*,  
 The wary *Fabius*, with delusive Wiles,  
 And cunning Feints, the Conqueror beguiles;  
 Watchful and wise diverts impending Fate,  
 And, by *delaying well*, preserves the State.

*Homer*, who best of Poets understood  
 To temper Heroes, or to form a God,  
 Makes bold rash Heat to cooler Conduct yield,  
 And Hotspur *Mars* to *Pallas* quits the Field.

F I N I S.

*Eusebius Pamphilus* his ten Books of Ecclesiastical History, faithfully translated and abridged from the Original, by *Sam. Parker, Gent.* to which prefixed a Dissertation concerning the Use and Authority of Ecclesiastical History by the Author of the *Scripture* in the *Gloss* in a letter to the abridger, with the Life of *Eusebius* abstracted from the best Authors. Also an account of his Works, and a large Index of the Memorable Persons &c. mentioned in the Abridgment, price bound 3 s. 6 d.

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